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×General Sanders was evidently as blunt as he felt he could be in his valedictory communication when standing down as Chief of the General Staff (CGS). From day 1 of his appointment he was publicly candid about the size of the Army, which did not sit well with the Secretary of State for Defence; it is well known that even exceptional politicians find it difficult to cope with inconvenient truths. Nevertheless, Wallace was considered one of our better politicians. I still wonder why the shining star that was Wallace faded so quickly. I do hope there is not an unedifying explanation. Sanders' assessment of British Army decline was as explicit as he dared to be but full of implicit warnings that will be lost on most people. He was absolutely right to make the case to re-arm as fast as we can (a huge challenge given our sclerotic acquisition processes). What was left largely unsaid is the inability of the Army to prepare, deploy and sustain itself in the field. During the Cold War, when we used to spend around 6% of GDP on Defence, the Army had four deployable Divisions, that exercised as a Corps within NATO. In the same era, 'Stables' parades were a feature of unit life whereby vehicles were taken out of their garages and cleaned, repaired and maintained. Detachment, vehicle or Crew Commanders and their associated personnel became very knowledgeable about the state of their vehicles; knew their strengths, weaknesses and idiosyncrasies. Understandably, a bond was formed with the vehicle platform that was to bear these personnel into and/or in battle. Being so in touch with key equipment heightened the chance of success in combat; the like of which has been torpedoed by something called Whole Fleet Management (WFM), arguably one of the most destructive policies ever implemented. The bulk of vehicles and equipment are no longer in unit lines, but held centrally (and certainly not enough to equip a comprehensive mobilisation) and 'maintained'. With the bonds of ownership broken, prior to an exercise (or Operation), vehicles and equipment are delivered from a central pool, quite often not on time or in a good state, and preparation/repair/familiarisation eats into valuable training time. Worse still, a paucity of military vehicles is often offset by civilian rental vehicles, which detracts from training and credibility still further, and some exercises would in all likelihood fail completely if personal mobile phones were not used; which tells you more about the Army's communications systems than it does about poor signals security behaviour. Whilst WFM may make sense to accountants, it has destroyed the crucial link of familiarity between operator and vehicle platform and signals equipment, that is likely to make a difference in the crucible of combat. Even if there were sufficient numbers of vehicles, there is a NATO-wide critical lack of strategic and operational lift capacity, whether that be air, maritime, rail or by road, to get them to the right place on time. Back in the 80s the British Army had over 1,000 Main Battle Tanks (MBT). On the books today there are 200 or so. I would risk a lot of money in betting that only about 100 are actually fully serviceable. As Sanders asked when he became CGS: why would he want to reduce the size of the Army in these turbulent times? Re-arming is one thing. Increasing the size of the Army is quite another. The rot set in with the demise of the Junior Army back in the 90s, compounded, amongst other things, by a disastrous privatisation of the recruiting function. Units are much reduced in size in terms of personnel. The persistent reduction of "our most important asset"1 necessitates the Army policy direction for new capability programmes to aim for personnel levels of less than the current level or at worst: no more. The reality is that many new capabilities will require greater personnel levels than currently, particularly if the Army is to double and then triple its capability. Even if t...…
Third Place (Joint) LH(EW) Lewis Batch, Northwood HQ It is more than 40 years since the Falklands conflict. Evaluate the challenges the Royal Navy face if it was to engage in a non-UN/NATO supported conflict in the Southern hemisphere. Context On 05 April 1982 the aircraft carriers HMS HERMES, HMS INVINCIBLE and their escort vessels, sailed from Portsmouth for the South Atlantic as part of the UK governments response to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. Then, as would apply now, the UK was not afforded protection under NATO's Article 5 'collective self-defence' (valid only for territories north of the Tropic of Cancer) and a solely British Military operation was initiated. Given the need to carry an invasion force over some 8,000 miles, the Royal Navy (RN) was to act as the main military apparatus in the transportation of the invasion force south: this was codenamed OPERATION CORPORATE. Forty-one years later and Argentina has elected a new president in Javier Milie, who is keen to re-open questions over the future of the Falklands sovereignty. This, coupled with the RN's recovery from a period of austerity-driven defence cuts, provides comparisons which are eerily reminiscent of the state of the RN in 1982. It is therefore appropriate to discuss whether the RN in 2024 could replicate a similar response to that that was launched in 1982. To make fair assessment, the following areas will be discussed: political appetite (and foreign policy), fleet size, technology, defence procurement, as well as the UK's relationship with her allies and the role of overseas bases. Political Appetite The UK government does and continues to demonstrate its desire to play a global role, meeting its commitment to international partners and defending peace and stability. This is evident from the UK's leading role in both the training and delivery of equipment to Ukraine since 2022; the commitment through OPERATION PROSPERITY GUARDIAN to ensure freedom of navigation through areas littoral to Yemen; notwithstanding swift responses to the 2021 Kabul Airlift, the evacuation of UK nationals from Sudan in 2023 and most recently, the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Importantly, it was the release of the 2021 Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper which reiterated the appetite for 'global Britain'. This manifested itself in a commitment to respond to both concurrent and new and emerging threats, focussing largely on the following methods: the need for a more forward based Navy, the ability to deploy one functioning aircraft carrier and investment in future technology, such a direct energy weapons and artificial intelligence. In short, the UK has demonstrated it maintains the political will to remain a global power in protecting its interests at home and abroad. However, this has been conducted with ever stretching resources, most notably, fewer available capital ships and a creaking support structure. Fleet Size With it established that the UK has the political will power to react to a theoretical conflict in the southern hemisphere, the next area of discussion lays with the current RN footprint and whether there is appropriate number of capital ships, auxiliary ships and supply chain to support extended deployment at high readiness. If we compare the current RN fleet with that of the task force sent in 1982, we can see numbers are significantly lower and this has continued to decrease in size. The OPERATION CORPORATE task group comprised of 127 ships: 43 RN vessels, (2 aircraft carriers, 15 frigates, 6 destroyers, 2 LPD's and 6 submarines), 24 Sea Harrier and 22 Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA). The 62 merchant vessels were British-registered vessels requisitioned by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), otherwise known as 'Ships Taken Up From Trade' (STUFT). In contrast, the current RN in its totality encompasses 66 vessels, drastically reducing to 21 when listing only capital ships:11 frigates, 6 destroyers, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 LPDs an...…
Third Place (Joint) AB David Dulla, HMS TAMAR It is more than 40 years since the Falklands conflict. Evaluate the challenges the Royal Navy face if it were to engage in a non-NATO supported conflict in the Southern Hemisphere Context and Considerations Argentina surrendered their claim on the British overseas territory 74 days after invading the Falkland Islands, an outcome determined by poor strategic planning coupled with an under estimation of the United Kingdom's political appetite for a military response. Using this short war as the sole benchmark for predicting future challenges for the Royal Navy is unreliable over 40 years later, however this essay argues the same four considerations still determine the scale and success of any scenario in the future. Political, social, environmental and economic factors drive the capabilities of everyone from the Prime Minister down to a tradesman running a small painting and decorating business, with all organisations subject to conditions of which they have limited levels of control. Challenges vary depending on these factors, but conclusions will highlight financial investments, determined by social and political support, will create risks for the Royal Navy. A turbulent world outlook and the NATO perspective Politically the United Kingdom is largely divided in 2024 between the Conservative and the Labour parties. The UK have led support for Ukraine in their ongoing defence when the Russian Federation invaded in February 2022, fuelling a deterioration in East-West relations which is comparable to the Cold War 1947-1991. Meanwhile, Israel invaded Palestinian Gaza in October 2023 after responding to a Hamas attack on a music festival, following years of unrest over territorial claims traced back to political agreements made in the wake of World War II. In addition, Yemen has seen the Iranian backed Houthis carry out attacks on western merchant ships attempting to transit the Red Sea. And finally, the People's Republic of China is attempting to assert dominance in the South China Sea, with the deployment of Royal Navy and NATO allies to safeguard free trade and fisheries. With these significant and potentially escalating conflicts dominating politics, focusing on the northern hemisphere is the key focus for UK governments. This prioritisation means deploying less operational capability south of the equator, arguably challenging the speed at which the Royal Navy's main fighting force could respond in these areas. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates an attack on British overseas territory south of the Tropic of Cancer would not qualify for collective defence between NATO Nations, and as seen in the Iraq War 2003 it is easier to make a political argument for military conflict when you are supported by other countries because resources and risks are shared. With no weapons of mass destruction found during the Iraq campaign, and 179 UK military personal losing their lives, the conflict and consequent enquiry conducted in 2016 concluded a deficient case for war where preparations were inadequate and military objectives failed. Tony Blair, the Prime Minister during the conflict, was scrutinised publicly which emphasised the personal accountability of decision makers. Poor intelligence prior to any conflict in the southern hemisphere would potentially lead to the same outcomes. Voters responded when Labours government lost the election in 2010, with a decline in electorate trust a contributing factor. Conversely, Thatcher gained popularity in her Britain-alone response seen in the Falklands, cementing the nickname 'Iron Lady' while seeing her landslide re-election in 1983 and 1987 following a conflict 8000 miles away from the UK but a beacon for political support. Both the Iraq and the Falkland conflicts were positioned as the defence of British security, but both had very different outcomes for politicians which influences their predecessors. The Royal Navy would encounter g...…
Second Place LNN Esme Clayton, Joint Hospital Group Memes or missiles? Should we invest more in Information Operations? Definitions To be able to discuss this accurately, we need to first understand what the word 'meme' means. Although, it may be commonly associated by being coined by Richard Dawkins in The Selfish Gene (1976) as a 'unit' of culture. We can look for the meaning of the word further back in time all the way back to the Greeks, where they used the word 'minema' meaning 'imitated'. To think of the word simply it can be defined as a type of behaviour, picture, text, containing information which is passed from person to person. Missiles are easier to define as 'an object which is forcibly propelled at a target'. Memes - an extension of a much older concept? Firstly, to look into the benefits of investing more into information operations, it is useful to look at an example of its use in WW2. Operation Mincemeat, was a successful British operation where they deceived the Germans into thinking that the allies were planning to invade Greece and Sardinia, when the actual target was Sicily. They did this by planting fake correspondents into a corpse dressed as a Major. As you can see from this example, the British used both tactics and sensitive information, to manipulate the opponents plans. The Germans doubled the number of troops sent to Sardinia, allowing the allies to fully capture Sicily. Another example was at the D-Day landings when they used dummy tanks to distract the enemy, and suggested that the Allies would attack other places to weaken German forces in Normandy. This would be in favour of the use of information operations in warfare, as we can see that it is very difficult to decipher what is fact and what is fiction, especially in heightened stress situations such as war. With the ever increasing knowledge behind technology and artificial intelligence, it would be vital for the UK to invest further into this, as it is impossible to predict what it could be used for in the future. The importance of critical thinking and analysis However, we are also able to use this example as a disadvantage of information operations, as the Germans saw the corpse of a 'Major' and gathered the information about the British and used it to defend their country. Although, the difficulty lies when interpreting which information is useful and which has been staged. For the proper use of information operations you need three core elements - intelligence, leadership and information systems. Firstly intelligence, intelligence is ever changing and it is one of the most dynamic elements in wartime, so it needs to be acted upon with speed and accuracy, in order to get the desired outcome. A strong leader is needed to ensure that there is strong decision making, they are able to critically think and visualise the battlefield, to come up with the best options with the information gained. And finally, the ability to acquire, analyse and store the information that is obtained. And a limitation of the final element, is that the information can be leaked or hacked, showing the importance of the first two core elements, to allow the information to be acted on immediately. With the current funding the armed forces are struggling to find the correct people who are qualified and have the desired experience for the role. It is understandable that the best minds in artificial intelligence, computers and social media are attracted to the high salaries in multi-international companies. If they invested more into intelligence operations, I believe a large percentage of this investment should be utilised to train people to correctly use information operations, as well as to decipher between correct and incorrect information. Are Info Ops effective in a modern, media-savvy world? There is evidence to show that although information operations in warfare was effective in the past, however, now they are more well known and exposed, meaning that they ar...…
One of the most remarkable literary achievements of the 20th century emerged in 1989 when W.W. Norton published Patrick O'Brian's multi-volume fictional re-creation of British naval life during the Napoleonic Wars. Eventually stretching to twenty books, O'Brian's account of the lives of Captain Jack Aubrey and his great friend, Doctor Stephen Maturin entranced reviewers and millions of readers. A reviewer from the New York Times stated that O'Brian's books are simply "the best historical novels ever written." "Master and Commander" is the first Hollywood movie made from O'Brian's books and what follows is not a review but rather an essay that uses the movie to frame a discussion of leadership. The focus is the character of Jack Aubrey- created by Patrick O'Brian, visualized by director Peter Weir and brought to life by actor Russell Crowe. An examination of Aubrey's behavior, thoughts and values throughout the movie provides a wealth of insight into the concept of leadership. As the movie begins, it is the spring of 1805 and we are aboard HMS Surprise, a small Royal Navy frigate with a crew of 197 souls and an armament of 28 guns. HMS Surprise serves as a tiny but exact mirror of the actual British navy and Jack Aubrey serves as an archetype of a fighting British sea-captain during the Napoleonic wars. As we will see, the movie title of "Master and Commander" is actually an incomplete description of Aubrey's role, which can more accurately be described as "Master, Commander and Leader." Each of these three roles describes a different aspect of Aubrey's performance. Each derives from a unique set of competencies but all three roles strongly complement each other. The fact that Aubrey is successful as master, commander and leader has a decisive effect on the course of events in the movie. HMS Surprise has left England under orders to find the French frigate Acheron and "sink, burn or take her as a prize." The Surprise is off the coast of Brazil and approaching a fogbank that seems to contain something suspicious. When the alarm is raised, we are introduced to Captain Jack Aubrey who peers into the fogbank, sees gunflashes and quickly realizes that the Surprise is about to be mauled by the larger, more heavily gunned enemy ship. Aubrey is energized by the prospect of combat ("straight at 'em, Mr. Mowatt!") but events quickly take a turn for the worse as Surprise's rudder is shot away and the British barely escape into the fog. We learn more of Aubrey in the wake of the Surprise's first disastrous encounter with the French. The ship's officers, somewhat in shock, are discussing the engagement and they observe that Acheron was "more like a ship of the line than a frigate" and "our shots couldn't penetrate." They all assume that the clear superiority of the French ship means the Surprise will have to abandon its mission and return to England. Their misgivings are well-founded. HMS Surprise, with 28 guns, is about as small as a ship can be and still be called a frigate. By way of comparison, the four British frigates that fought at Trafalgar were all armed with at least 36 guns. Jack Aubrey, however, sees the situation from a very different perspective. Positively radiating with decisiveness, he tells his officers that there is not a moment to lose if they are to carry out repairs and catch up with the French. As the ship recovers, we see an absolute beehive of complicated, intense activity; a visual reminder that warships of this period were the largest, most complex and deadliest moving objects in the world. In addition, these ships were a veritable "system of systems" and competent commanders had to know every aspect of their ship. We see Captain Aubrey talking gunnery with the gunner, navigation with the sailing master and ship repairs with the carpenter. Aubrey's obvious competence links to a leadership insight derived from Clausewitz. The Prussian philosopher of war once observed that great leaders need to be decisive but it...…
Giving our people a platform Here at The Wavell Room, our message has always been loud and consistent: critical thinking and writing is not (and should never be) just an 'officers' sport'. Professional development amongst the serving community must always be encouraged, and given the exceptional intelligence, insight and quality of our people their voices must be heard. To that end, it is an absolute pleasure to be able to announce that the Royal Navy has granted us permission to publish the best placed articles written for this year's edition of the Lt Cdr Hooper essay competition. This annual event is open to Junior Ratings and Other Ranks in all branches of the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, Royal Fleet Auxiliary and Maritime Reserves; including those holding acting higher rank (i.e. Substantive Leading Hand / Corporal and below). The Challenge Each year, three questions are offered up for analysis and response. This year, the titles on offer were: 1. Memes or Missiles? Should we invest more in Information Operations? 2. It is more than 40 years since the Falklands conflict. Evaluate the challenges the Royal Navy face if it was to engage in a non-UN/NATO supported conflict in the Southern hemisphere. 3. Allyship in the Royal Navy. Why is it important and how is it going? Winners - 2024 It was so tough to judge this year, that some extra prize money was rustled up to allow for a Joint 3rd Place finisher. BZ to all, and we at the Wavell Room very much hope that you enjoy their musings. First Place ET(ME) Joseph Hardiman - Essay 2 Second Place Leading Naval Nurse Esme Clayton - Essay 1 Third Place (Joint) AB David Dulla - Essay 2 LH(EW) Lewis Batch - Essay 2 The Lt Cdr Hooper Prize This annual essay competition commemorating the late Lt Cdr Geoffrey William Winsmore Hooper OBE RN is open to all Junior Ratings across the Royal Navy and aims to broaden current affairs knowledge. Prize money is provided from a trust fund established in 1952 by Lt Cdr Hooper's mother. Aged only 30, Geoffrey Hooper was killed in a motor accident 2nd January 1923 in Hong Kong. Anyone keen to enter the 2025 competition should look out for the relevant RNTM on the RN Intranet.…
First Prize Winner ET(ME) Joseph Hardiman, Disposal and Reserve Ships Organisation It is more than 40 years since the Falklands conflict. Evaluate the challenges the Royal Navy face if it was to engage in a non-UN/NATO supported conflict in the Southern hemisphere. The Challenge The Royal Navy faces significant challenges in engaging in a conflict in the Southern Hemisphere without UN/NATO interoperability and support. To ascertain the scope and gravity that underscores these challenges, this essay will focus upon identifying potential adversaries and the specific threats they pose to Britain. This analysis will not only highlight the viability of any hypothetical engagement but also underscore the critical nature of these threats. Secondly, addressing the lack of support is crucial. Although the possibility of forming sub alliances, as successfully done in past engagements, exists, and is explored through this essay, ultimately this scenario must be approached from a worst-case perspective. This methodology allows the Royal Navy to discern between its interoperability with NATO and its veritable shortcomings in both platform capability and lethality. Today, whilst the Royal Navy is exceptionally capable in certain areas it is too small to engage in conflicts at the scale it once could, and it cannot single-handedly meet the diverse threats emerging in an increasingly contested Southern Hemisphere. Non-traditional adversaries While it's important to note that the Royal Navy's primary adversaries lie in the Northern Hemisphere, namely Iran, China, and Russia, through careful analysis, it has become abundantly clear that the Southern Hemisphere presents a distinct set of challenges that the Royal Navy must rigorously evaluate to sustain its efficacy and lethality as a formidable fighting force. These encompass overseas British territories, inhabited by British subjects entitled to protection, as well as emerging threats from an increasingly contested region of the world. Firstly, the Falklands is still a significant point of contention for both Britain and Argentina. In 2013, a British-sanctioned referendum was conducted, which saw 99.8% of islanders voting to remain under British control. However, a poll conducted in the same year by YouGov, ascertained that only 15% of Argentinians shared the conviction of the British government, that the Islanders had a right to self-determination. This sentiment was tacitly reflected by the incumbent president Javier Milei, who in 2024 stated a desire to establish a clear "roadmap" to patriate the Falkland Islands into "Argentine hands." Although he emphasized that any pursuit would be through "diplomatic channels" the situation still presents tangible concern for Britain. Milei is a populist, whose mandate survives on catering to the wants and desires of the ordinary citizen. In a country that firmly believes the Falklands belong to them as evidenced further by their celebration of Las Malvinas day annually (Argentine name for the islands), the failure of diplomatic channels could lead Milei, much like Galtieri in 1982, to leverage an invasion of the Falklands to stoke Argentine nationalism. Global Threats While the Falkland Islands present the most tactile point of contention, it is important to underscore the issue of new emerging threats. These are evidenced by adversaries from the Northern Hemisphere intensifying their presence within the region both directly and indirectly, presenting political and economic threats to both the Royal Navy and Britain. Firstly, The Maritime Security Threat Advisory (MTSA) reported in 2024 that an Iranian vessel had entered the Southern Hemisphere, citing this as "the first" instance of this happening. This exemplifies a navy, once decimated by the United States in 1988, now exhibiting defiance and a growing confidence. It is increasingly willing to extend its influence into new regions, thereby presenting a burgeoning threat. To compound this further,...…
Pride and Fall tells the story of the British Army and Royal Marines (and more broadly Defence) campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan 2001-2014. It mixes high-level discussions with strategy with tactical vignettes. It offers a highly readable, highly credible history of the period. This book is bloody brilliant. We highly recommend it. From people who served in Afghanistan to warfare experts to those with a casual interest, Pride and Fall will help anyone understand. Miller's clarity coupled with a deep understanding of what happened during the campaign make this highly readable. He does it with an engaging style and sense of wit that few can match. Blow by blow account? In many ways Pride and Fall is a blow by blow account of the land campaign in Afghanistan. Its chapters are chronological, dealing with the campaign as it happened. It offers tactical details with a clear narrative of events. But you would be mistaken if you thought this was a narrative history. Miller brings out the personalities of the commanders and their preparations to show how they impacted the conduct of the war. For example, 'mowing the lawn' of early campaigns and 'clear hold build'. It also charts how the campaign developed - or didn't - and questions why. This analysis alone makes it a useful reference for future study. Miller identifies and explores named individuals to the level of critical analysis that he does, which is something few others have done as effectively. A veteran British reader will recognise many (now senior generals) in their formative years. The title of the book gives away the general argument about the conduct of the war. Miller's text charts the good and the bad of British strategy. Pride and Fall considers that the war lacked a strategy. But he is not entirely dismissive of Britain's efforts. The rise and increasing effectiveness of intelligence is a key success. The conduct of Op HERRICK 13 is a high point of success, one let down by a lack of resources to exploit it before the drawdown. Just because some things were bad, not all of it was. His ability to assess the relative merits and offer a nuanced view of the campaign sets it apart from more traditional 'good or bad' narrative history. Reading it from a doctrine perspective, Pride and Fall adds historical context from which to judge the effectiveness of Britain's new counter-insurgency doctrine. We might conclude, crudely, that Britain had 'all the ideas none of the gear'. But Miller wouldn't quite put it like that. Miller's wider points about how to be better should be grasped by a modern Army facing similar challenges in the future. Strategy and tactics Another theme is the interaction between strategy and tactics. The pressure on resources balanced against the reliance on the US is key throughout. London, Miller shows, struggled to stay relevant despite the commitment of British blood and treasure. Multiple Defence Secretaries, changing generals, the home front. How these big hand themes played out on the ground, and notably the C2 challenges it created, offers new angles to consider. But Pride and Fall doesn't only deal with the science of war. There are long sections detailing the ground reality. These moments offer a glimpse into the human struggles. For example, the role of Company Sergeant Major 'Billy' Roy who straps antlers to his quad bike to deliver Christmas dinners, or the more human details about living outside the wire (or more crudely, taking a **** whilst freezing on a mountain). Not to mention more relevant examples of long insertion tabs, coalition tensions, human relationships that actually win campaigns. Pride and Fall combined these tactical and human moments with a sense of how they contributed to the wider mission. It brilliantly demonstrates the British soldier (and Marines) sense of humour. Who is the author? Sergio Miller is a former Intelligence Corps officer and a regular Wavell Room contributor. His analysis of the war in Ukraine ...…
BLUF: This paper proposes the creation of the structures and conditions required to train, lead and deploy a cost-effective Citizen Tri-service Reserve Force at scale during periods of stretch, tension, crisis or war. The Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force would be available for use. (1) as a third echelon front line fighting force, (2) providing rear area and lines of communication security and (3) in homeland defence, protecting critical national infrastructure.This will be achieved by establishing cadres of experienced ex Regulars and Volunteer Reservists capable of initially training and subsequently leading the Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force. Against a changing threat the UK is likely to require more people in uniform than we have now. The Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force concept utilises those who have already served, putting them in place to prepare thoroughly as training and leadership cadres while saving in the short to medium term the cost of recruiting, remunerating and equipping the bulk of the rank and file (90% of the workforce). It then sets the conditions to expand when required by having experienced leadership in place to build around. Strategic background The threats facing NATO in general and the UK in particular have escalated dramatically following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Furthermore, Eastern Europe is only one of several areas of the world where tensions have risen substantially over recent months and years; any of the others of which (eg Taiwan, Middle East) could erupt so as to distract key allies at a critical moment, potentially reducing their ability to support their NATO commitments in Europe. Additionally, depending on the attitude of individual NATO members, including a possible future US President, Article 5 of the NATO Treaty may not be quite as binding as is widely assumed. All of this needs to be set against a context in which the UK has the smallest standing army since Waterloo. Our navy and air force are similarly diminutive. Our Defence remains configured primarily for discretionary campaigning (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) and has not yet fully switched to prepare for non-discretionary conflict against a peer adversary. The current SDR provides an opportunity to address this necessary change in orientation, which is likely to require the provision of mass in uniform. Why we need the ability to generate mass As demonstrated clearly in Ukraine, in a war of any duration, units become worn out and need replacing in the line to rest and recuperate. The UK has no provision for this. Secondly, if the UK is operating in Eastern Europe in support of its NATO allies, it will have extremely long lines of communication along which its ammunition, equipment, workforce and rations will need to travel. Protecting such lines of communication needs "teeth" units, including infantry, light armour and air defence, especially against drones. Thirdly, substantial additional resources are needed to support the defence of the UK's critical national infrastructure. The outgoing Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Patrick Sanders, publicly raised the importance of the UK's ability to create military mass if required in a time of crisis in January 2024. He was referring to a citizen army (the "third echelon") which history shows is needed to win our wars; under this concept, as in both World Wars, a small core of Regulars (the "first echelon") fight to buy time; the Volunteer Reserves (the "second echelon") then reinforce and help to hold the line; and the citizen army (the "third echelon") concludes the conflict. Access to large numbers of cost-effective teams and a trained workforce from all three services would be essential in such circumstances. Warfighting assumptions always expect a war to be over within weeks rather than months or years (the size of our armed forces is indeed currently based on this assumption); history, and current events in Ukraine, shows this to be over-o...…
Tradition can be defined as an inherited, established and customary pattern of thought or action that can be transmitted from generation to generation due to their commonly accepted authority. In a military sense, Army traditions encompass customs and beliefs that unite different sets of soldiers. These traditions take form to us as behaviours, doctrine and actions. The British Army's website states that 'The British Army is a professional and disciplined team, with a long tradition of service to the country'.1Readers can infer that this means the Army does the nation's bidding, whether at war or peacetime, without delay or question. This endures (and has done since 1689) always; we know this from the long standing function of Parliament to authorise taxes for war and defence. It can be safely assumed then that the 'tradition' of the British Army being ever-present and ready to provide defence for the British people is a good one. Does tradition hold us back? But do Army traditions hold us back in other areas of defence? As the Army evolves and responds to current and emerging threats can it respond sufficiently? Valerii Zaluzhnyi wrote recently that technology 'boasts an undoubted superiority over tradition'.2 Arguably he was cornered into this analysis through the rigours of a war he oversaw as the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army, until February 24. However, Zaluzhnyi's dismissal does not make it a poor analysis; Zaluzhnyi's Army went to war with Russia and faced some of the most extreme fighting in Europe since WW2. They have had to adapt and survive whilst holding off Russian military superiority and they learned quickly that holding on to tradition and current thinking was costly. Adapting to the threat and remaining fluid is one thing; changing your approach entirely is quite another, but quite necessary according to Zaluzhnyi. When Zaluzhnyi mentioned 'traditions' (doctrine & processes), he was talking about improving the situation on the battlefield. He went so far as to state that a wholesale redesign of battlefield operations was needed to distance themselves from outdated, stereotypical thought processes that were harming his troops and country's war effort through simply being not up to task. This redesign, he concluded, would reshape Ukrainian military doctrine on a fundamental level for the better and help Ukrainian soldiers compete with and defeat Russian troops. This would however require substantial buy-in to be successfully integrated. No small task but surely too risky to ignore; the war with Russia was handing out lessons in evolutionary warfare and Zaluzhnyi was paying attention. Relevance of experience The British Army has had no such recent exposure or conflict with a peer adversary. The COIN environment in Iraq and Afghanistan taught us valuable lessons in insurgency warfare, counter-IED, ISTAR and medical support which 'had a profound impact on the Army's equipment, training and doctrine',3 but arguably did not find shortcomings in it. Consequently we have no experience of what should be retained and what should be dismissed or updated regarding our approach to warfare and warfighting. How are we to know if our doctrine will hold up in a large-scale peer to peer engagement? We have banked heavily on the Land Operating Concept (LOpC): 18 months in the making, full of NATO partner consultation input and interrogated by RUSI, ISS and DTsL; it is the doctrine that dictates how we will win future wars. General Sir Patrick Sanders said it is 'the most robustly evidenced and inclusive piece of conceptual thinking that the Army has produced in over three decades. This places the British Army at the intellectual edge of land warfare, able to lead in NATO and support our sister services across all domains'. 4 The LOpC clearly shows then that as an organisation we are attuned to the need to evolve and adapt to the changing threats around the globe. It highlights the need for need for technological sup...…
"The Reservist is twice the citizen" - Winston Churchill Genesis The Royal Navy (RN) has the Maritime Reserve (MR), a 1* led Fighting Arm1 (FA), however, it could be argued that it is not taken seriously as a capability and is therefore not value for money. If the RN were to take the Maritime Reserve seriously, the MR would require a directed operational output, a 'head mark', a thought-out function, in conjunction with regular cadre of personnel who are taught the necessary knowledge and experience on how to employ it to enhance naval power. This article offers options for the output the MR should have in supporting the RN operationally. Its time to move on from the 'fantasy fleets'. Instead, lets discuss NATO-level, UK Defence-wide, and RN-specific strategy statements to derive function and in turn, elicit discussions of form. It will not - unlike a recent RUSI2 paper - look to use the Royal Naval3 Reserve (RNR) in addressing potential capability gaps in UK Defence. Though, its potential scope is MR wide, its focus is the RNR, as the largest MR element and the one facing the hardest questions about its future operational utility. Additionally, this paper is written in the spirit of the Chief of the Defence Staff's recent direction4 on embracing debate from juniors in challenging the status quo. "A good Navy is not a provocation to war; it is the surest guaranty of Peace" - Theodore Roosevelt Function The RNR/Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) were formed in 1859 and 1903 respectively, to supply sailors in times of war for the RN; the MR now is approximately 3500 people spread across the RNR & Royal Marines Reserve (RMR) and is the only standalone reserve organisation in UK Defence. The war in Ukraine and recent events in Israel5show that Reserves are still vital for delivering national security; internationally their use also mimics how our own Naval Reserves were used during both world wars. In WW2, 68%6 of Naval personnel were Reservists of various kinds7, who jokingly referred to their regular counterparts as the "caretakers"8. Such past precedents beg contemporary questions: could today's RN triple its personnel numbers swiftly in a time of major conflict, and would it need to? Today, the Maritime Reserve is a mere 10%9 of total RN personnel - but if the RN embraced use of reservists as Australia does (30%), could this alleviate personnel gaps too, while being better value for money? The UK is not currently under an immediate existential threat (barring a catastrophic escalation of the war in Ukraine or entanglement in a US-China conflict). However, the function of the RNR and wider reserves should be designed around a framework that recognises the possibility of direct interstate conflict - not just the precursory stages such as competition and crisis to ensure our continued national security, as articulated in the most recent Defence Command Paper (the 2023 'Refresh'). The utility of the RNR to the RN is primarily to supply Surge in war while being affordable and Niche in peacetime. Yet the recent cancelling of training on financial grounds (the infamous "In-Year Measures"), effects from COVID, and Maritime Reserve "Transformation" (a euphemistic label for various top-down reorganisations) has lowered morale, seeing an exodus10 from the trained strength. In NATO, there are four11 recognised types of reservists. Niche(specialist) capabilities that do not exist, at all or in sufficient strength, in the regular forces. Complementary. This is a capability - at the lower end of the operational spectrum - for which the full suite of military competencies is not needed, freeing regular forces. Supplementary. This is a capability at the higher end of operations to rotate or reinforce the regular forces. Surge. This is an expansion base for mobilisation in a large-scale defence emergency, the traditional Reserve role. In the Future Reserves 3012 paper, the role of reservists is articulated as. The Reinforcement Reserve - r...…
Introduction Since the Gaza war began nearly a year ago, Israel has conducted dozens of airstrikes against Iranian-linked targets across the Middle East. There is a widespread concern that the ongoing low-level conflict may escalate into an all-out war between the two nations. Nevertheless, Tehran, for its part, does not seem inclined to escalate into a full-scale war. There are six pivotal reasons for Iran's strategic impasse. Fear of a Regime Change The first reason relates to Tehran's prioritisation of regime preservation. Iran knows that the Islamic regime itself may become the primary target for removal in a conflict. Iran's economy is strained due to long-standing sanctions and domestic economic challenges. A direct conflict with Israel would worsen Iran's economic troubles. Moreover, ethnic minority groups within Iran, such as the Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, and Baluchis, have long been exasperated with the Iranian regime and there is a genuine risk that Israel may engage with these groups. Potential US Involvement A second factor is that a war between Iran and Israel would likely draw the United States, Israel's historic ally, into the war. The power asymmetry between the US and Iran is striking. The US stands unmatched in its capabilities. Conversely, Tehran's efforts to modernise its conventional forces have yielded limited success due to the country's defence economics problems. Regional Interests Tehran's direct war with Israel would certainly jeopardise its regional interests. Iran strongly emphasises advancing its sectarian geopolitical ambitions within regions traditionally considered part of the Iranian/Shia sphere of influence. A direct conflict with Israel could potentially provide opportunities for Saudi Arabia, a key antagonist seeking to counter Iran's growing influence in the Middle East, and its allies to exploit the situation to their advantage. Strategic Culture The Iranian army has not faced a large-scale war since the Iran-Iraq war. The bitter experience of the war with Iraq led Iran to move away from conventional warfare tactics. Iran has opted for asymmetric strategies instead of engaging in a direct war with its adversaries. Iran supports Hezbollah, Houthis, and Hamas due to their shared objective of opposing Israel. This allows Tehran to pursue its objectives while minimising the risk of direct and large-scale retaliation from Israel. The relative success of these methods has reinforced Tehran's commitment to an indirect approach. Nuclear Program The fifth reason influencing Tehran's unwillingness to confront Israel is its progressive advancement in its own nuclear program. Iran has been enriching uranium to higher levels, developing more sophisticated centrifuges, and enhancing the range and payload capacities of its ballistic missiles. Initiating a full-fledged war against Israel would risk undermining this progress, given that it could provoke strikes on Iranian nuclear personnel and facilities. Winning Strategic Battle of Perception The last point worth mentioning is Tehran's belief that engaging in a direct confrontation with Israel would eventually benefit Israel at a time when global opinion is turning against it due to the significant civilian casualties and suffering in Gaza. In contemporary wars, military victory is no longer solely defined by battlefield success, as in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict. It is possible that Israel could face a similar destiny in Gaza. Therefore, Iran is very likely leveraging Israel's aggressive response against Hamas to undermine Israel's and, by extension, the United State's credibility. What Might Come Next? Iran is confronted with a challenging situation: it must find a way to respond that upholds its reputation while mitigating the risk of escalating to full-scale war with Israel, a scenario in which Tehran stands to lose more than it stands to gain. Choosing inaction or a feeble response could erode the domestic unity of the Iranian regime. Iran's d...…
Introduction On 23 August, the Houthis, a Yemen-based rebel group, attacked a Greek-flagged vessel in the Red Sea, causing an oil leak and threatening an environmental catastrophe in one of the world's most frequently used waterways. On 2 September, the group attacked a Saudi and a Panama-flagged oil tanker in the same sea area- using a combination of missiles and one-way attack drones. These attacks are part of a broader campaign carried out by the Houthi rebels since Israel's war on Gaza that involve hybrid maritime warfare. Since October 2023, the Yemen-based group has attacked more than 100 commercial and military ships in the Red Sea. The Houthi movement claimed that they viewed any vessel connected to Israel or heading to or from there as legitimate targets. However, in practice, they have conducted indiscriminate attacks on ships from various nations. Hybrid Maritime Warfare The Houthis' actions perfectly align with what leading US defence intellectual Frank G. Hoffman once called hybrid maritime warfare. Hoffman has defined hybrid maritime warfare as 'a form of warfare combining asymmetric naval tactics, sophisticated weapons, and terrorist activity'. He argued that Iran and Iraq's systematic attacks against merchant vessels in the late 1980s, which became known as the Tanker War, exemplified maritime hybrid warfare. A non-state armed group, the Houthis, has now adopted this method of warfare. The Houthis possess advanced military capabilities, including anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, aerial drones, and uncrewed naval drones. The group has primarily targeted commercial vessels in their attacks, with these actions against Red Sea shipping clearly constituting maritime terrorism. They have also attacked military ships. In early March, the rebels used naval missiles and drones against several American and allied warships in the Red Sea. Such attacks can be classified as guerrilla warfare at sea. The group's combination of advanced conventional capabilities with asymmetric naval warfare tactics - characterised by surprise attacks on enemy ships and efforts to avoid military response - represents a hybrid maritime threat. But who are the Houthis, and what drives them to pursue such a campaign? Who are the Houthis? The Houthi movement, also referred to as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), is a Yemen-based armed political and religious organisation associated with and acts on behalf of the country's Shia Muslim minority, the Zaidis. The Houthi rebels captured Yemen's largest and capital city, Sana'a, in 2014 and have since waged a fierce and protracted civil conflict against the Yemeni government, which is itself supported by the Saudi-Arabia-led Sunni alliance. The Houthis currently wield substantial political power in Zaidi-majority areas of Yemen. Why are the Houthis attacking ships at the Red Sea? The Houthis, alongside various non-state actors, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Kata'ib Hezbollah, identify themselves as part of the Iranian-led 'axis of resistance' against Israel and the United States. Since Israel's war on Gaza, the rebel group has fired more than 200 drones and cruise missiles at Israeli territory to show its solidarity with Hamas. Houthi leaders have repeatedly warned of escalating and more sophisticated military assaults against Israel, calling for an end to Israel's brutal war on Gaza. As previously noted, the Houthi rebels have also carried out attacks against dozens of merchant and naval vessels in the Red Sea, regardless of their connection to Israel or its allies. These actions aim to disrupt international shipping and create anxiety among countries that support or at least do not contradict Israel's actions in the Gaza Strip. The Houthis and Iran The main factor giving the Houthis access to advanced weapons is their close ties with Iran. The Houthi movement engages in sectarian geopolitical projects in alignment with Tehran's pursuit of regional hegemony. In return, Iran has large...…
Terminology versus motivation Reluctance, risk aversion, and the wrong centre of gravity Useful scenarios The Army does not have the luxury of being able to ignore criminal actors Feature image credit: MOD
"The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting" ~ Sun Tzu Why didn't Russia deploy amphibious forces to the shores of Odesa in the spring of 2022? At that point, Russians confronted the failure of the drive to Kyiv and challenges along a long front. A potential landing might have turned a flank or presented hard choices to Ukrainian leaders. Unarmed with first-hand evidence of Russian decision-making but well-served by hindsight, the authors assess that the amphibious flanking attack didn't happen because it was infeasible. Ukrainian maritime defenses were unexpectedly effective. Sustaining forces ashore would be precarious. Isolated Russian troops ashore would be more liability than asset, and so the expected payoff from any landing was low. Russian commanders faced an acute area denial challenge. Amphibious warfare strategy, it seems, is in need of some exploration because, after a deterrence failure in February 2022, Ukraine used tools of sea denial to deter the Black Sea Fleet from an amphibious landing in March. This snapshot raises a question and points to an answer. What can you do with amphibious forces given current area denial, especially sea denial, measures; particularly in Europe? Those tools of sea denial mean that fouling the waters is easy but clearing them is hard. Because of this, sea denial is easier today and sea control is growing more challenging. Threats to large landing ships make traditional amphibious assaults - called forcible entry operations in the American vernacular - riskier. Simply using amphibious forces to do ground operations in a new patch of land is too hazardous. On the other hand, a divergent model has promise to contribute to sea control. Concepts designed for the Indo-Pacific have value in Europe Specifically, deploying multiple, distributed, mobile cohorts of NATO marines ashore will support a broader effort. To gain and maintain sea control will be long, resource intensive, and entail a complex mix of complementary measures. In Europe, NATO can marshal potent amphibious tools, but will need new employment models to use them effectively. The traditional model expects a methodical sequence of actions to set conditions for landing. A new "outside-in" model uses small landing forces preemptively to establish sea and archipelagic denial. This is most valuable for deterrence, but counts also as insurance in case that deterrence fails. Four factors have the most impact on how allied amphibious forces can operate in today's operational environment: 1. First is the spread and variety of threats to maritime transit. Ukraine's successful strikes on Russia's Black Sea Fleet and the Houthis' parried attempts to disrupt Red Sea commerce illustrate the same point. The latent potential to strike ships at sea is widespread. Beneath the surface and out of view, sea mines, torpedoes, and other nefarious but subtle instruments of destruction or disruption abound. 2. Second, an accident of geography places many key geopolitical flashpoints of today along narrow waterways. Any list of potential triggers for major armed conflict between defenders of the current order and its challengers includes territory adjacent to narrow or enclosed waterways such as the Mediterranean, Black, or Baltic Seas. Regardless of where an adversary might strike, be it in Lithuania, Taiwan, or the contested territories of the South China Sea, maintaining sea control will be critical to defense. Consider that Finland relies on maritime transit for 90% of its imports and exports. 3. Third, NATO's two newest members, Finland and Sweden, have mature and hardened capabilities to frustrate aggressive maritime harassment and targeting. Integrating such skills is a key advantage of their accession. 4. Fourth, sophisticated defenses against aircraft and missiles are possible but costly. What we've seen in the past year in the skies over Kyiv, Tel Aviv, and the Red Sea is that air and missile defense is feasible but no...…
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